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THE CASE FOR PREFERRING PATENT-VALIDITY LITIGATION
OVER SECOND-WINDOW REVIEW AND GOLD-PLATED PATENTS:
WHEN ONE SIZE DOESN’T FIT ALL, HOW COULD
TWO DO THE TRICK?

F. SCOTT KIEFF

†

Complaints about frivolous patents abound in academic, business, and
policy circles, and the focus of blame is usually on the large number of junk
patents that have issued from the Patent Office that are actually invalid. The
underlying cause is said to be the relatively modest examination performed by
the Patent Office. Most popular proposals for change suggest methods for segregating patents into two or so bundles based on whether the patents should be
subject to closer examination. A so-called “second window of review” has been
proposed to allow competitors to make the choice of which patents get closer examination; and a so-called “gold-plated approach” has been proposed to allow
patentees to make the election. Applying a back-to-basics approach, this Article
points out two core problems with these popular proposals: (1) they do not adequately account for the information costs, error costs, and risks of capture that
accompany any system premised on flexible and discretionary administrative
review, and (2) they overlook the central lessons learned through debates over
civil litigation generally about how to balance the conflicting goals of speed,
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cost, accuracy, and finality. The Article then elucidates how some small
changes to our patent system could be used to better solve the problem of bad
patents than would other popular proposals. This small number of changes,
which are implementable through either case law or statute, would interact to
make available a symmetrical risk of fee and cost shifting for bad-faith litigation over patents to encourage parties to exchange information and resolve disputes before getting deeply into expensive litigation. Such an approach would
directly address the complaints of patent critics without injecting the degree of
unpredictability and political manipulability into the system that would be
caused by their proposed changes. It takes seriously the importance to the economy of strong intellectual property rights as well as reforms designed to lessen
the negative impact of junk patents and frivolous lawsuits.
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INTRODUCTION
Complaints about frivolous patent suits abound in academic, business, and policy circles. The focus of the problem is the tendency of
businesses, both large and small, to find themselves having to defend
against large numbers of lawsuits over junk patents that have issued
from the Patent Office but that are actually invalid—a death by a
thousand pin pricks created by the lure of occasional high damages
awards in cases adjudicated to involve infringement of valid patents.
The underlying cause is said to be the relatively modest examination
that the Patent Office gives to the vast majority of patent applications
before they are issued as patents. In decision-making terminology, the
problem is seen as a screening process that is underinclusive.
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In response, most popular proposals are directed at ways to segregate patents into two or so bundles, based on whether the patents
should be subject to more scrutinizing examination procedures. A socalled “second window of review” has been proposed to let competitors make the choice of which patents get closer examination; a socalled “gold-plated approach” has been proposed to allow patentees to
1
make the election. Both proposals are on top of significant recent
changes that have occurred in the underlying substantive criteria for
assessing patentability through cases like the KSR International Co. v.
2
3
Teleflex Inc. decision on obviousness and the In re Bilski decision on
permissible subject matter.
One fundamental shortcoming of these approaches is that they do
not adequately consider the information costs, error costs, and risks of
political capture that accompany any system premised on flexible and
discretionary administrative review. The extensive scrutiny they impose leaves some patent applications tied up in the administrative
process for too long and some patent applications unduly rejected. A
new problem has crept in: the screening process has become overinclusive. Indeed, the system now is both underinclusive, in allowing
too many low-quality patents, and overinclusive, in erecting too many
barriers to patents. In addition, an administrative stacking problem
arises as these enhanced procedures are piled on top of the increased
flexibility already injected into the substantive criteria for patentability
by recent changes in case law. This combination leaves the system
vulnerable to too much flexible discretion, exposing flexibility’s Achilles’ heel. Flexibility increases the discretion of government bureaucrats, which has the effect of increasing uncertainty rather than decreasing it, and gives a built-in advantage to large companies with
hefty lobbying and litigation budgets by making it much easier for
them to tie up any patent owned by a smaller innovator. Moreover,
these heightened costs of administrative process are imposed without

1

See, e.g., Mark Lemley et al., What To Do About Bad Patents?, REGULATION, Winter
2005–2006, at 10, 12-13 (“[A]pplicants should be allowed to ‘gold-plate’ their patents
by paying for the kind of searching review that would merit a presumption of validity.”).
2
See 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007) (holding that a patent was invalid having decided that
it claimed a combination of two pre-existing technologies that any person of ordinary
skill in the art would have been motivated to combine in a way that would have been
expected to achieve the claimed invention).
3
See 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (narrowing what constitutes patentable subject matter in the field of business methods), petition for cert. filed, 77
U.S.L.W. 3442 (U.S. Jan. 28, 2009) (No. 08-964).
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the benefits that generally motivate the case for administrative agencies: the need for judgment calls by leadership.
A second fundamental problem with these approaches is that by
woodenly splitting patents into different categories of treatment, they
overlook the central lessons learned from debates over civil litigation
generally. Civil litigation should pay attention to a set of goals including speed, cost, accuracy, and finality—the same set of goals that mo4
tivated drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. That is, our
thinkers, policymakers, and practitioners have already carefully developed over many years a set of rules designed to address these conflicting goals through the fairest process that we have to offer. This system provides rules governing the procedures for joinder, compulsory
counterclaims, issue preclusion (also called collateral estoppel), and
claim preclusion (also called res judicata), which are collectively designed to avoid abusive and repetitive process, as well as rules for procedures such as summary judgment, which are designed to avoid long
5
trials in which there is no genuine issue of material fact.
This Article elucidates how some small changes to our patent system could solve the problem of bad patents better than other popular
proposals. We should (1) return to the rule that gave patentees easier
access to enhanced damages and (2) dial down the presumption of
validity to give alleged infringers easier access to the same when the
patentee is on notice of the key prior art. Such symmetry in cost and
fee shifting would encourage parties to exchange information and resolve disputes before getting deeply into expensive litigation. The
goal of this proposed reform is to directly address the complaints of
patent critics without injecting the degrees of burdensome process,
unpredictability, and political manipulability into the system that their
proposed changes would cause. The approach proposed here takes
seriously the importance to the economy of strong intellectual property
rights and the importance of reforms designed to lessen the negative
impact of junk patents and frivolous lawsuits.
I. OVERALL INTELLECTUAL APPROACH
This Article builds on prior work that applies a “basics matter” approach to commercial law. This approach takes seriously the core
4

See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“[These rules] should be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”).
5
See id. 13(a) (compulsory counterclaims); id. 18–22 (joinder of claims and parties); id. 24 (permissive and of right intervention); id. 56 (summary judgment).
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principles and features of distinct areas of law, including their history
6
and internal normative debates, while applying the intellectual tools
from the field known as New Institutional Economics (NIE), or The
7
New Institutionalism, to highlight the ways that property rights in intangible assets can be structured so as to improve economic development, innovation, and competition by encouraging private actors to
interact and strike deals with each other rather than with legislators,
regulators, judges, and the powerful political constituents who influ8
ence these government actors. Following this approach when thinking about how to structure or improve a system of laws focused on
market-based financial activities (as compared with those laws focused
on subjects such as fairness and civil rights), we should begin our
analysis of a particular problem with an understanding of the set of
underlying goals. When making decisions about how to address such
a problem, we should try hard to determine how future parties will
deal with similar situations in the face of various possible legal responses to present ones. That is, we should see things as dynamic, not
static. We should also fully expect that we will not be able to select the
true, correct outcome in a given case with certainty. Thus, we should
try to develop a set of comparative analyses of relative magnitudes and
frequencies of the inevitable over- and underinclusiveness associated
with different legal regimes designed to address the problem. We
should also develop an understanding of who is the lowest-cost pro6

See, e.g., F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes, The Basics Matter: At the Periphery of Intellectual Property, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 174 (2004) (urging that when problems arise at
the interfaces that IP law shares with other areas of law, such as contract or antitrust,
attention should be paid to considering the full range of interests from each of these
distinct disciplines rather than taking any subset of them out of context).
7
See, e.g., F. Scott Kieff, Coordination, Property, and Intellectual Property: An Unconventional Approach to Anticompetitive Effects and Downstream Access, 56 EMORY L.J. 327 (2006)
[hereinafter Kieff, Coordination, Property, and Intellectual Property] (providing a more indepth discussion of NIE analysis of enforcing IP like other forms of property); F. Scott
Kieff, On Coordinating Transactions in Intellectual Property: A Response to Smith’s Delineating Entitlements in Information, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 101 (2007) [hereinafter
Kieff, On Coordinating Transactions in Intellectual Property] (providing a brief NIE analysis
of enforcing IP rights like other forms of property). This Article also expands and updates the particular ideas about how to improve decision making about patent validity,
as explored in F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and Economics of
Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 55, 118-22 (2003) [hereinafter Kieff, Registering Patents], which elucidates how less searching review, such as mere registration
without examination, may minimize the overall social costs of patent procurement and
enforcement.
8
See, e.g., Stephen H. Haber et al., On the Importance to Economic Success of Property
Rights in Finance and Innovation, 26 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 215 (2008) (providing an
NIE discussion of the importance of property rights to economic success).
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vider and evaluator of the information needed to make an appropriate decision, and we should be vigilant about administrative costs in
different decision-making processes. We should be vigilant about the
transaction costs of those deals needed to help ensure that resources
regularly move to their highest and best use as well as the agency costs
for those hierarchies we create within organizations. Throughout it
all, we should be very skeptical of comparative exposure to publicchoice problems, such as capture, for each different available approach.
II. PATENT THEORY
A well-functioning patent system can effectively and efficiently target a relatively modest set of underlying goals. Like fame, cash, tax
credits, and other rewards, patents do provide some incentive for inventors to invent. However, patents are somewhat sloppy in providing
this effect, largely because direct incentives often are unneeded, difficult to target toward particular problems, and difficult to allocate
among those contributing solutions. But unlike direct rewards, a wellfunctioning patent system does a particularly good job of getting inventions put to broad and rapid use by facilitating coordination
among the many complementary users of inventions—inventors, capitalists, managers, laborers, developers, marketers, and distributors,
among others. In so doing, patents bring new inventions and new
business lines to market, thereby improving both access to these new
technologies and competition for customers. To achieve this effect,
patents must be predictably obtainable and enforceable so that they
draw together each of these diverse individuals and businesses (i.e.,
they must have a beacon effect). They must also encourage dealmaking (i.e., they must have a bargain effect) over a range of valuable assets, many of which are so unlike the typical assets of a financial portfolio that the possibility of later receiving some risk-adjusted,
objectively-measured financial reward from the government or a de9
fendant in a lawsuit will not encourage their investment ex ante.
While granting patents efficiently requires mitigating some standard problems, this is accomplished to an important degree by standard tools that have long been incorporated into the basic substantive
rules for obtaining patents. For example, forcing the residual claim-

9

See Kieff, On Coordinating Transactions in Intellectual Property, supra note 7, at 102-03
(discussing the benefits of this socially constructive coordination).
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ant of the asset to, at the time of filing, stake out the boundaries of the
claim that can eventually be issued serves to mitigate the problem of
10
rent dissipation by those seeking the entitlements. Designing the
prior art rules to prevent patents from issuing on what can be verifiably shown to have been within the set of technologies in which third
parties could have invested before the patent’s inventor serves to mitigate the asset-specificity and opportunism concerns of these third par11
ties. Designing the publication rules of 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) and the
disclosure rules of 35 U.S.C. § 112 to put the world on notice of patent
claims soon after an application is filed serves to mitigate similar opportunism concerns of third parties arising after a patent is filed. And
designing rules that allow private parties to reliably transact over and
enforce patents in ways that allow the underlying assets to be bundled
and divided as the parties desire serves to mitigate transaction costs.
Nevertheless, concern that the substantive-law rules for patentability are not being appropriately applied by the Patent Office, resulting
in too many junk patents, is what motivates the popular procedural
reforms designed to address today’s junk patents. Because of the legal
presumption of validity that all issued patents presently enjoy, those
who have to defend themselves from litigation over junk patents experience undue transaction costs in the form of large numbers of patent litigations that are relatively inexpensive to bring and relatively
expensive to defend. Opportunism problems also arise when the effective scope of valid patent claims is not clear enough to help potential infringers determine what will infringe until the patent claims are
asserted and adjudicated. The resulting view is that a better administrative-decision-making process would avoid the costs of the litigation
process. This begs questions, however, about the basic rationales behind these two types of decision-making options, as discussed below.
III. THEORY OF PROPOSED DECISION-MAKING OPTIONS
This Part explores the paradigmatic types of the two proposed
government decision-making options: agencies and courts. It recognizes a proper role for each; and this Article does not endeavor to
make an overall case for preferring one over the other in every setting. Instead, the focus is on the relative case for each when applied
10

This is one role played by patent law’s disclosure requirements. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 112,(2006).
11
This is the role played by the novelty, bar, and nonobviousness requirements.
See 35 id. §§ 102-03.
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to patents. This Article also recognizes that while courts do evince
some of the political influence and normative bias associated with
agencies and while agencies do engage in adjudication somewhat like
courts, the basic differences between the two are well recognized
throughout the literature and the policy debates, and this recognition
of these differences presumably motivates the continued use of each
decision-making option.
A. Administrative Agencies
The classic rationale for the existence of administrative agencies is
focused on the need for specially trained elites who are subject to political hiring and oversight by the branches of government that themselves are politically elected and who make executive decisions that involve the judgment calls of leadership, often those on which
reasonable minds can differ, such as whether it is better in some over12
all sense to go in one direction or another. For example, in the
long-studied case of environmental regulation and pollution relating
to soot from a factory, society must make carefully balanced choices
13
among the various costs and benefits of the factory and the soot.
The factory’s owners, workers, creditors, suppliers, and customers
would likely prefer the air to be free of emissions rather than polluted,

12

See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights,
95 HARV. L. REV. 1193 (1982). In describing the public values theory of agencies,
Stewart and Sunstein write that
the purpose of administrative agencies is to help to define and realize social
and economic norms in industrialized society. . . . [It is] not a matter of counting economic costs and benefits, or of defending private entitlements, but
part of a continuing process of deciding what sort of a society we shall be—
how risk averse, how hospitable to entrepreneurial change, how solicitous of
the vulnerable, and how willing to allocate resources through markets or public control.
Id. at 1238; see also Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 439-46 (2003) (reviewing various approaches to administrative law
and describing the ultimate persistence of each); cf. JOHN S. APPLEGATE ET AL., CTR.
FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, WHITE PAPER NO. 90, REINVIGORATING PROTECTION OF
HEALTH, SAFETY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT: THE CHOICES FACING CASS SUNSTEIN
(2009), available at http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/SunsteinOIRA901.pdf.
(providing a critical review of the balancing choices made following the cost-benefit
analysis approach to administrative law).
13
Compare A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 160-61, 166-68 (1920) (emphasizing the need to set a perfect tax or subsidy for each activity that creates externalities), with R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 6-8 (1960) (noting
the inherent reciprocity of these externalities).
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while at the same time preferring to maximize the pool of profits, investment opportunities, jobs, products, and services that can be generated by the factory for their benefit, assuming all other things are
equal. The conflict between these goals is mediated through the nature
and degree of regulatory restrictions placed by the relevant administrative agency (e.g., the EPA) on the factory’s operations.
Such decisions are left to the administrative agency because society recognizes that the decisions ultimately involve a large amount of
normative and political content, intentionally allocating costs and
benefits among various competing groups of citizens, such as those
who today are financially engaged in the ongoing enterprise and
those who tomorrow will have to live with the longer term consequences of pollution from that enterprise. And the rules governing
judicial review of agency action are designed to give great deference
to these executive-judgment calls precisely because of the expertise
and political import of the underlying decision makers.
B. Court Litigation
The classic case for litigation in the commercial setting (if not also
in others) is for politically isolated decision makers to determine
whether a particular historical set of facts has occurred and to then
order the legally relevant outcome required by these facts. The judge
is supposed to neutrally apply the procedural rules and resolve legal
questions, and then either the judge or the jury is to neutrally decide
the open factual questions. Great effort is made to generally keep
value judgments out of court.
The fact-finding mission of litigation begins with extensive rules of
discovery, which require the parties to provide to each other vast
quantities of truthful information—often including terabytes of electronically recorded documents, written answers to interrogatories,
sworn depositions, and plant inspections. The trial is conducted to
allow the fact-finder to hear conflicting testimony from live witnesses
subject to cross-examination, to directly observe tangible evidence,
and to hear oral arguments, all so that she can make a well-informed
decision about which factual inferences should be drawn from the
14
evidence of record. Speaking in terms of America’s favorite pastime,

14

See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (“Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences
from the facts are jury functions . . . .”).
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decision makers in litigation are supposed to call the balls and strikes,
15
not select the strike zone to achieve a normative goal.
The procedural rules governing litigation (mainly, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure) are designed to achieve the goals of speed,
cost, accuracy, and finality, not the goal of furthering political and ex16
pert discretion. They begin with the jurisdictional rules of ripeness,
mootness, and standing, which limit power to initiate these expensive
proceedings to only those parties who, at the relevant time, have a real
17
case or controversy. They also include rules that allow almost immediate dismissal for grounds such as failure to state a claim upon which
18
relief can be granted. They then guide the discovery process to en19
sure full exchange of information before trial. They allow for summary judgment to avoid trial when there is no genuine issue of mate20
rial fact.
They offer a set of rules on joinder, compulsory
counterclaims, and issue and claim preclusion (or collateral estoppel
and res judicata, respectively), which are collectively designed to avoid
21
abusive and repetitive process. At least two rules allow the award of
sanctions to discourage and punish abuse of process: Rule 11 requires
22
pleading in good faith, and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 targets vexatious litiga23
tion. And the deference required by rules governing appellate review of trial court decisions is based on the lower body’s proximity to
24
the evidence as well as pragmatic division of labor principles, rather
than on that body’s technical or bureaucratic expertise and political
15

See Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2326, 2339
(2008) (“[I]t is not for us to substitute our view of . . . policy for the legislation which
has been passed by Congress.” (quoting In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del., 335 F.3d 243,
256 (3d Cir. 2003))).
16
See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“[These rules] should be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”).
17
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (defining the federal judicial power as extending to “cases” and “controversies”).
18
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
19
See, e.g., id. 26 (governing initial and pretrial disclosure).
20
Id. 56.
21
See id. 8(c) (listing estoppel and res judicata as affirmative defenses); id. 13 (governing counterclaims and crossclaims); id. 14 (governing third-party practice); id. 1821 (governing joinder of claims and parties).
22
Id. 11.
23
See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2006) (permitting courts to sanction attorneys who “unreasonably” or “vexatiously” multiply proceedings).
24
See Mucha v. King, 792 F.2d 602, 606 (7th Cir. 1986) (ascribing to Rule 52(a) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “notions of the proper division of responsibilities
between trial and appellate courts” as well as “considerations of comparative accessibility to the evidence”).
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import. Indeed, where a lay jury has decided questions of fact, the
deference is even greater in recognition of the importance of this civic
check on government power.
IV. PROPOSALS IN PRACTICE
This Part applies the theory of patents to the theory of available
decision-making options to compare the reform proposals focused on
administrative agencies offered by others with those focused on court
litigation offered in this Article. Recognizing that the contest for policy attention is very much an uphill battle for those focused on litigation, only a basic sketch is presented rather than a detailed account.
The hope is that if significant headway is made in the marketplace of
ideas, later progress can be made on the details of implementation.
A. Increased Reliance on Administrative Agencies
The popular proposals for targeting junk patents focus on various
administrative approaches to better weed out those patents that needlessly trigger the high transaction costs of patent litigation because
they should not even have issued from the Patent Office (usually because they run afoul of the patentability rules relating to the prior
art). A second window of review has been proposed to allow competitors to choose which patents get closer examination, and a gold-plated
approach has been proposed to allow patentees to make the choice
for increased examination. For both, the stated goals are to achieve a
mechanism for deciding validity that is faster or less expensive than
court.
While desirable in the abstract, these goals are dangerous when
taken out of the context of their conflicting counterparts among the
set of goals associated with civil litigation generally (such as accuracy
and finality). That is, before simply trying to change some characteristics of this highly complex and interconnected system, we should at
least consider the full range of concerns explored earlier in the discussion of intellectual approach.
We should begin by focusing on the underlying information
needed to make the relevant decisions about validity over the prior
art. Determinations about the prior art are largely questions of fact,
based on evidence such as documents and factual testimony, as compared to opinion testimony or executive discretion. For example, two
famous cases about prior art—cases involving particular student theses
catalogued and shelved in the libraries at Freiburg University in Ger-
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many and Reed College in Portland, Oregon —remind practitioners
that factual proof is required to show not just what these documents
contain, but also when they were physically available to the public
(such as by being actually placed on a library shelf) and logically available to an interested searcher through some meaningful indexing system (such as a subject matter catalog). Other cases involve the prior
invention by some particular third party and remind practitioners that
factual proof, including independent corroboration, is required to
show that this prior invention actually occurred and that it was public
27
(or at least not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed).
We should then determine who is the lowest-cost provider of the
information needed to make such determinations. While it makes
sense to ensure that our Patent Office examining corps has good access to internet databases and ample time and training to peruse
them, no realistically available amount of time, training, and access to
commercial databases will help an examiner at her desk obtain an obscure student thesis on the bookshelf of a foreign library or a specific
laboratory notebook corroborating the work of an individual researcher. Yet these are the pieces of information—the evidence—that
are needed to make an informed decision about validity over the prior
art.
Providing more administrative process will not help address the
problem of improving access to the actual evidence about prior art for
the decision-making enterprise because administrative process is not
what gets that evidence. The people who are the most interested in
obtaining this hard-to-get evidence about the prior art are the potential infringers who face expensive patent litigation—often costing several million dollars per party—and potentially more expensive patent
remedies. These parties rationally elect to spend the money it takes to
fly a lawyer to a foreign library to collect sworn statements, official
business records, and other evidence, as well as the often greater re25

See In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 898-900 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that a doctoral
thesis that was shelved at a university library in Germany was sufficiently publicly accessible to be treated as a “printed publication” under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006), making
it available as prior art against a patent).
26
See In re Cronyn, 890 F.2d 1158, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding that three undergraduate theses “had not been catalogued or indexed in any meaningful way” and
so would not be treated as “printed publications” under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)).
27
See Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 477, 494-98 (1850) (applying the predecessor to 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) and not counting the use of a technology relating to a safe
as prior art unless it is accessible to the public); see also 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (derivation);
35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (prior invention).
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sources it takes to even select a particular library as the source of key
information. No feasible administrative process would have government agency officials go to similar lengths.
We also should be vigilant about public-choice pressure and recognize that attempting to avoid these costs by giving Patent Office examiners a pass from having to get this hard evidence would not come
without the serious consequences of political influence and capture.
Asking a decision maker to base her decision about what she thinks
the state of the art was at a particular time in history on her internal
specialized training and expertise rather than on hard evidence from
the outside world gives her much greater discretion than asking an
ordinary jury whether a particular document or sample product existed at a particular time and what that document actually contains.
Even ordinary lay juries can be particularly adept at making such factual determinations, which is a central reason we have a constitutional
28
right to jury trials in every criminal case under the Sixth Amendment
and in most civil cases involving a legal remedy such as damages (as
opposed to only an equitable remedy such as an injunction) under
29
the Seventh Amendment. Because large firms have fatter budgets
for pursuing legislative, administrative, and judicial action than
smaller innovators, such discretion converts the patent system into a
tool for suppressing competition by making it much easier for big
firms to tie up any patent owned by a small innovator.
We already see existing administrative procedures such as inter
partes reexamination being abused to tie up patents in administrative
purgatory when their validity over the prior art has already been tested
in court or before another agency like the International Trade Com30
mission. Indeed, the well-known strategy for an aggressive alleged
infringer today is to adopt a “cut off the opponent’s oxygen” strategy
that places under reexamination not only those patents that the pat-

28

U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial . . . by an impartial jury . . . .”).
29
U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .”).
30
See, e.g., J. Steven Baughman, Reexamining Reexaminations: A Fresh Look at the Ex
parte and Inter partes Mechanisms for Reviewing Issued Patents, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC’Y 349, 358 (2007) (noting that forty-one percent of inter partes reexamination requests involve patents already in litigation); Andrew S. Baluch & Stephen B.
Maebius, The Surprising Efficacy of Inter partes Reexaminations: An Analysis of the
Factors Responsible for Its 73% Kill Rate and How to Properly Defend Against It, 2, 7
(2008), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/law/baluchmaebius.pdf (finding that contested reexaminations have an average pendency of 42.5 months).
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entee is or might be asserting in court but also all those patents in the
patentee’s portfolio that are being used to raise capital and support
31
other essential business relationships. And we have already seen the
ability of behind-the-scenes political influence to simply block a particular patent from issuing from the Patent Office on grounds of policy instead of evidence in cases ranging from the 1972 Gottschalk v.
32
Benson decision, involving a Democratic administration, to the 1994
33
In re Alappat decision, involving a Republican administration. The
problem is only exacerbated by the recently demonstrated willingness
of congressional committees to hold legislative hearings on the validity of a competitor’s patents and then propose legislation designed to
make those patents unenforceable, despite serious and obvious sepa34
ration of powers concerns. What is worse, these heightened costs of
administrative process are imposed without the benefits that generally
motivate the case for administrative agencies.
Today’s patent system already too closely resembles the burdensome and byzantine procedures described in Dickens’ A Poor Man’s
35
Tale of a Patent. Adding subsequent windows of administrative review
will only make matters worse. A better direction is to strip away the
range of inter partes administrative procedures and adopt the set of
changes to court litigation that are proposed below.
B. Reforming Court Litigation
Under the present system, the high costs of junk patents are directly tied to the legal presumption of validity that is applied to all issued patents, under which the litigant challenging validity bears the
burden of proving invalidity under a higher standard of proof than

31

See Posting of Jack Davis to SiliconBeat, Local Firm Blames 25% Job Cut on Microsoft Action, http://www.siliconbeat.com/2008/03/26/local-firm-blames-25-job-cuton-microsoft-action/ (Mar. 26, 2008) (noting that Microsoft placed all twenty-nine patents held by its potential competitor Avistar into reexamination).
32
See 409 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1972) (holding that a computer program was not a patentable process).
33
See 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (relying on the production of a “useful,
concrete and tangible result” in determining that an invention involving a mathematical algorithm was patentable), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(en banc).
34
Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Lawmakers Move to Grant Banks Immunity Against Patent Lawsuit, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2008, at A22.
35
2 CHARLES DICKENS, A Poor Man’s Tale of Patent, in WORKS OF CHARLES DICKENS
150 (1869).
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36

that which usually applies in civil cases. The increased burden is
called the “clear and convincing evidence” standard, which contrasts
with the “preponderance of the evidence” standard more commonly
applicable in civil litigation, including for the patentee seeking to
37
prove infringement.
The costs under the present system of knocking out even a plainly
obvious patent can be very large. The threat of expensive litigation
over even such a questionable patent terrorizes potential defendants,
large and small, under the current patent system. This in terrorem
problem, however, can be greatly mitigated through measures that are
more targeted than injecting administrative discretion of the type dis38
cussed earlier.
This Article proposes that we mitigate the in terrorem effect by
beginning with the carefully balanced set of rules generally available
39
in civil litigation, explored earlier, which target the goals of speed,
cost, accuracy, and finality, and then adding a dialed down version of
the present presumption of validity set to be something like the ordinary standard for civil cases. This could be achieved by reversing
through court decision the judicially implied substantive burden now
associated with the presumption or by amending Section 282 to expressly state that the presumption is procedural only. The current terrorization of potential defendants would be lessened by allowing alleged infringers to collect attorneys’ fees from a patentee who brings
an infringement case having been warned, for example, about particu40
lar prior art that would cause a court to hold the patent invalid. This
practice of fee shifting in cases where a patentee makes baseless arguments in defense of the patent’s validity would match the rules
41
(which were recently abandoned) that allowed patentees to get enhanced damages and fees from infringers who should have known
about infringement but failed to avoid it while mounting baseless ar-

36

See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006) (“A patent shall be presumed valid.”).
See Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 147 F.3d 1358, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(requiring the challenging movant to show invalidity of the claims by “clear and convincing evidence”).
38
See supra Section III.A.
39
See supra Section III.B.
40
For more on fee shifting and incentives to settle, see, for example, George L.
Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 6-12
(1984) and Keith N. Hylton, Fee Shifting and Predictability of Law, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
427, 436-40 (1995), for a discussion of the Priest-Klein model.
41
See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
37
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42

guments in defense of the patent infringement. Allowing symmetry
in fee shifting would encourage parties to exchange information and
resolve disputes before getting deeply into expensive litigation. The
goal of this proposed reform is to directly address the complaints of
patent critics without injecting the degree of unpredictability and political manipulability into the system that would be caused by their
calls for flexibility and discretion.
Fee shifting in patent cases is generally tied to the question of willfulness because 35 U.S.C. § 285 allows a court, “in exceptional cases,”
to “award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.” The paradigmatic example of an exceptional case has long been understood in
43
patent law to be one in which the infringement is considered willful.
Although the full impact of the case is still uncertain, the ability of
patentees to obtain enhanced damages for willfulness may have been
significantly curtailed by the August 2007 Federal Circuit decision in
44
In re Seagate Technology, LLC. In that case, the Federal Circuit seemingly established a new requirement for proving willful infringement:
a showing of “objective recklessness” on the part of the infringer,
based on a two-step test requiring that a patentee (1) show that the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that her actions
infringed a valid patent, with the infringer’s subjective state of mind
being irrelevant; and (2) that the objectively high risk was either
45
known or should have been known to the infringer. The court took
pains to emphasize that “[b]ecause we abandon the affirmative duty of
due care, we also reemphasize that there is no affirmative obligation
46
to obtain opinion of counsel.” The court also strongly suggested that
a substantial question regarding infringement or validity that is sufficient to avoid a preliminary injunction is likely sufficient to avoid a
finding of willful infringement. But because permanent injunctions
are likely to be significantly harder to obtain after eBay Inc. v. MercEx47
change L.L.C., the preliminary injunctions contemplated by Seagate
are even more unlikely. In addition, because the general uncertainty
42

See 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006); see also id. § 284 (allowing a court to “increase the
damages up to three times the amount found or assessed”).
43
See Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 688, 690-91 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (“Cases awarding attorney fees to prevailing patentees have typically found ‘exceptional’ circumstances in willful and deliberate infringement . . . .”).
44
497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
See 547 U.S. 388, 390 (2006) (discussing whether a patentee is entitled to an injunction after validity and infringement have been adjudicated).
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injected by other recent changes in substantive patent law through
48
49
cases like KSR and Bilski is likely to leave most patent-infringement
cases in a bad position for a preliminary injunction, the new Seagate
test probably means that all those cases are also now in a correspondingly bad position for enhanced damages. Put differently, after Seagate
it is hard to imagine a patentee who can win enhanced damages regardless of the notice that she gives the defendant, and as a result it is
also hard to imagine what will make a case exceptional for purposes of
shifting attorneys’ fees in view of this new standard for willfulness.
Implementing the reform proposed here would likely require a statutory or judicial reversal of Seagate in order to return to the previous
practice of requiring opinions of counsel in patent litigations to police
the question of what makes for an exceptional case.
Imagine a patent system in which both patentees and potential infringers had good access to fee shifting when the other side’s case was
baseless or exceptional. The patentee would want to educate the alleged infringer about the strength of the infringement case relatively
early in the process because this would increase the patentee’s chance
of getting enhanced damages and attorneys’ fees. Under the old,
asymmetrical rule of fee shifting, the alleged infringer had a strong
incentive to avoid notice by avoiding communication. Under the rule
proposed here, the alleged infringer would have a symmetrical incentive to educate the patentee about any validity-destroying prior art so
as to increase the alleged infringer’s access to attorneys’ fees. Symmetry in fee shifting helps align the parties’ incentives to communicate
with each other about the evidence that each has about the weaknesses in the other’s case.
Under such a system, the former markets for audit-type opinions
of counsel would grow. Under the old rules, the alleged infringer was
the one who often wanted to get an opinion of counsel early in the
process so as to later bolster arguments that it had a good-faith basis
for believing that it did not infringe valid patent rights, thereby decreasing the chance it would have to pay enhanced damages or attorneys’ fees if it lost the case. Under the rule proposed here, the pat-

48

See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1732 (2007) (rejecting a strict
application of the “teaching, suggestion, or motivation test” in favor of an approach
focused more on “common sense”).
49
See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 965-66 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (holding that a
business method encompassed a “purely mental process” and thus was not sufficiently
tangible to be eligible for a patent), petition for cert. filed, 77 U.S.L.W. 3442 (U.S. Jan. 28,
2009) (No. 08-964).
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entee would also want to get an opinion of counsel as soon as it was
put on notice of the killer prior art so as to later bolster arguments
that it had a good-faith basis for believing there was infringement of
valid patent rights, in order to avoid paying the alleged infringer’s attorneys’ fees.
As the need for opinions increases, the costs borne by each individual player will decrease. Under the old practice, each party interested in assessing the validity of a patent typically had to hire its own
opinion counsel, which was expensive. Under the proposed practice,
it will be easier for third parties to spread these costs across multiple
customers by starting businesses that provide rating services akin to
those seen in today’s capital markets to evaluate a particular company’s stock or bond offerings. While it is recognized that the capitalmarket rating agencies have come under great scrutiny in the recent
financial collapse, they have functioned well for some time, and,
unlike the mass-market and broad consumer participation of the financial system, the patent system relies more heavily on smaller numbers of more sophisticated actors.
The approach proposed here will also slightly decrease the average value of all patents because patentees will now have to fight
harder on the issue of validity when they assert their patents in court.
But this is not necessarily bad. The cost of arguing to the Patent Office for patent rights in the first instance will be less than the cost in a
system under which the examiner can reject applications on the basis
of her own discretionary views and under which abusive administrative
hurdles can be heaped in front of every patent through repetitive reexamination and second-look review.
Most importantly, the approach proposed here directly addresses
the fears of those held hostage under the current system by the threat
of litigation costs that surround patents merely presumed valid. Under a decreased presumption of validity, the terrorizing effect largely
evaporates.
The system makes sense at a macro level as well. Because most
patents do not matter, society acts rationally when it elects not to conduct a thorough examination of every patent application up front at
50
the Patent Office. Even for those patents that do matter, the infor-

50

See F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions,
85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 713 n.76 (2001) (noting that numerous patents are later held
invalid by a federal court); Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95
NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1501, 1504, 1507 (2001) (estimating that less than two percent of
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mation about the prior art that is needed to assess their validity is
more accessible to private parties than it is to the Patent Office, and
those private parties are better positioned to decide when it is worth it
51
to seek that information and analyze it. Indeed, these facts are readily available to both the patentee and the alleged infringer, each of
whom is free to find the facts if and when the party determines that
the effort is worth the cost of making such an investigation.
While the total number of patent litigations will likely not decrease, the overall cost and length of these proceedings are likely to
meaningfully decrease in those cases where one side is asserting arguments unsupported by a good-faith factual basis. Recognizing that
one size rarely fits all, such an approach allows parties and courts to
make ongoing determinations as to whether each case should persist.
Therefore, the test for the success or failure of such an approach is
not overall settlement rates studied by the traditional Priest-Klein ap52
proach or by its adherents and opponents, but rather the overall
ability of lawyers to accurately advise commercial clients when it is becoming time to withdraw during a case. The reason that this approach makes sense is that it directly targets the relevant overall social
question: asking in each case at the time that it becomes fairly clear,
based on the fulsome bundle of facts (here verified through the litigation context) brought to the attention of some relevant decision makers (here the parties), whether a decision can be made in a relatively
timely, inexpensive, and accurate fashion.
In the end, a weakening of the presumption of validity would be
particularly good for the “Davids” of the system who face off against
the “Goliaths.” It directly protects them from the in terrorem effect of
junk patents—i.e., the threat of expensive but baseless litigation to defend against patents having no more validity than that which is provided by the presumption. It also indirectly helps these potential victims raise the funds needed to litigate against a baseless opponent
regardless of whether they are asserting patent infringement or invalidity. The ability to get attorneys’ fees in baseless cases opens up the
market for contingent and other flexible fee arrangements for those
too liquidity-constrained to fight on their own.
patents are litigated and about five percent of patents are licensed for revenue, while
nearly two-thirds of patents are eventually abandoned).
51
See Kieff, Registering Patents, supra note 7, at 74-100 (arguing for a soft-look examination system).
52
George L. Priest, Reexamining the Selection Hypothesis: Learning from Wittman’s Mistakes, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 215, 216-22 (1985); Priest & Klein, supra note 40, at 6-30.
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Like any proposal, the call for a weakening of the presumption of
validity is likely to face a number of objections. Some are likely easier
to overcome than others. One conceptual objection likely to be raised
at the outset is that the presumption of validity plays a central role in
maintaining the predictability of the patent system for those who invest in and around patents. Absent this presumption, it might be argued, patents will not be worth much more than the paper on which
they are printed. Theoretical fears about such paper patents, however, do not measure up against actual experience. Even after the recent financial-market crash, we cannot overlook the fact that the largest capital market in the history of human experience is centered on
“paper filings.” The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
could examine each stock offering to determine whether it was better
than alternatives, based on a sound business model or other relevant
considerations. Instead, the SEC largely operates a registration system
focusing on the adequacy of disclosure contained in each prospectus
and registration statement, endeavoring to ensure their clarity and
truthfulness, but not passing on the substance of whether they make a
53
good investment.
On a more practical level, some may argue that increasing reliance on opinions of counsel will make it harder for lawyers to give advice. The crux of this argument is the old tension underlying the attorney-client privilege. On the one hand, it is often important for a
decision maker to verify whether a party actually acted with good advice of counsel. On the other hand, it will be difficult for a lawyer and
client to openly discuss the strengths and weaknesses of various approaches if they know that all of their communications are likely to be
subject to open review in court.
But, to a large extent, this is a false dichotomy. One lesson our
society learned from corporate scandals like the one involving Enron,
is that decoupling auditing from advising can be very important. An
opinion of counsel about a patent can be an important auditing tool
that should be kept separate from the important advice that a client
needs throughout the process of conducting its affairs in the competitive market and in litigation. The Federal Circuit should be mindful
of the benefits of maintaining these distinctions as it works to clarify
the law relating to attorney-client privilege for patent opinions of
counsel in the wake of its recent, foundational en banc decision on

53

See 1 LOUIS LOSS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 195-215 (4th ed. 2006) (discussing securities-registration and reporting requirements).
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attorney-client privilege for opinions of counsel in Knorr-Bremse Systeme
54
v. Dana Corp.
Others may argue that heavy reliance on opinions of counsel will
just lead to every business file being decorated with a favorable opin55
ion. The fear is that any good attorney can make an argument supporting either side of every case, especially if the law makes possession
of such a document a tool for decreasing the damages that her client
56
may have to pay in court.
But this argument also ignores the reality of practice in patent
cases. Our federal courts have neither hesitated to sniff out bogus
opinions of counsel nor to be very firm in specifically calling out their
authoring attorneys and law firms. For example, in Johns Hopkins Uni57
versity v. CellPro, Inc., the defendant company’s legal advisor, a member of the company’s board of directors, was an experienced patent
lawyer and former Patent Office examiner. He also had previously
been a partner in the law firm with the lawyer who authored the very
opinion found insufficient to insulate the defendant from a finding of
willfulness. The district court issued a critical opinion that extensively
discussed both lawyers by name as well as the name of the law firm,
holding that the opinion of counsel was
so obviously deficient, one might expect a juror to conclude the only
value they had to CellPro in the world outside the courtroom would have
been to file them in a drawer until they could be used in a cynical effort
to try to confuse or mislead what CellPro, its Board, and counsel must
58
have expected would be an unsophisticated jury.

The Federal Circuit affirmed on this issue with a somewhat shorter
opinion that also criticized both the lawyers and the law firm (which is
59
no longer in business) by name.

54

See Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d
1337, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc) (holding that no adverse inference of willful
infringement can be drawn from invocation of attorney-client privilege by a defendant
in an infringement suit).
55
See Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh K. Tangri, Ending Patent Law’s Willfulness Game, 18
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085, 1092 (2003) (arguing that companies that understand the
system will pay the amount of money necessary to obtain an opinion that is favorable).
56
See id. at 1092-93 (“Lawyers will generally be able to come up with plausible arguments that the patent is invalid or not infringed.”).
57
978 F. Supp. 184, 187 (D. Del. 1997), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 152 F.3d 1342
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
58
CellPro, 978 F. Supp. at 193.
59
CellPro, 152 F.3d at 1364.
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Even the Federal Circuit, which many see as too biased in favor of
patents and patentees, has aggressively policed baseless litigation by
patentees. Although a trial court typically has the discretion to grant
60
or deny sanctions, the Federal Circuit in Judin v. United States held
that the trial court abused this discretion in determining that the pre61
filing inquiry made by Judin and his attorney was reasonable. Prior
to filing the complaint, Judin and his attorney had observed from a
distance an accused device while it was in use at a post office, but neither Judin nor his attorney had attempted to obtain the device from
the Postal Service or the manufacturer in order to more closely observe it, nor did they make any attempt “to dissect or reverse-engineer
62
a sample device.” Judin’s attorney merely “reviewed one of the as63
serted patent claims” and stated that he “saw no problem with it.”
The Federal Circuit found that it was actionable misconduct for Judin
and his attorney to have conducted virtually no investigation before
64
determining whether Judin’s claims had any foundation. Indeed,
Judin itself shows that putting one’s opponent on proper notice of the
weaknesses in the opponent’s case allows prudent counsel to protect
herself from frivolous litigation, even under the existing system, using
procedural rules designed to curtail bad behavior in litigation in all
civil cases.
C. Common Concerns with Both Approaches
The following set of additional concerns is common to both administrative and judicial approaches to determining patent validity.
While they should be addressed regardless of the approach adopted,
they are easier to address by diverging from the general course of recent changes in the law and implementing the judicial approach offered here.

60

See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c) (“[T]he court may impose an appropriate sanction on
any attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule [on representations made to the
court].”).
61
110 F.3d 780, 781 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
62
Id. at 784.
63
Id.
64
See id. (“[T]here is no doubt that Judin failed to meet the minimum standards
imposed by Rule 11 . . . .”).
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1. Maintaining Flexibility and Minimizing Uncertainty
A great deal is made of the desire for patentees to have some flexibility in deciding how best to shape patent claim scope after the initial
65
filing of an application, as well as the desire for third parties to be
certain about what infringes so as to avoid opportunism problems
66
based on investments that they make after the patent is filed. While
these goals may be seen as conflicting, the dichotomy is false.
The disclosure rules required by the first two paragraphs of section 112 of the Patent Act can be implemented in a way that gives patentees a high degree of flexibility and breadth in claim scope while
still giving third parties a high degree of notice about the scope of the
67
patented claims. The basic operation of section 112 allows a patentee to draft at the time of filing a disclosure that would support,
under the written description and enablement requirements, a broad
class of claim terms that could later be inserted into patent claims.
For example, the application could include a broad definition of a
term like “fastener” (or even a made-up word like “widget”). This
definition might include nails, screws, staples, chewing gum, spit, and
static electricity; be supported by a detailed text explaining how to
make and use these members of the class; and provide physical,
chemical, electrical, or other scientifically reproducible criteria for
identifying what members of this class have in common and what distinguishes them from nonmembers of the class. Then, throughout
the pendency of that application, and even for continuing applications that maintained appropriate co-pendency, the applicant could
add claim terms that fell within this class, even if those particular
65

The Supreme Court’s continued interest in the “Doctrine of Equivalents”—a
body of law that allows patentees to capture territory beyond the literal scope of their
claims—is motivated by this interest in giving patentees additional wiggle room. See
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40-41 (1997) (reaffirming the vitality of the doctrine).
66
The desire of courts to cabin patent claim scope furthers this notice function of
claims. See Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc. 73 F.3d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (deciding that notice function is best furthered by restraining claim terms to the
narrowest of available definitions).
67
See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (requiring an enabling “written description of the
invention” along with claims that “particularly point out” the legally protected territory). Indeed, the case law remained fairly stable in this area from at least as early as
Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1991), to at least as late as the Rochester case in 2004. See Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 930 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) (finding that a class of methods for selectively inhibiting one pathway over
another was not supported by disclosure that did not recite a specific compound that
performed the method).
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terms were not themselves literally recited in the application as filed.
This would allow patentees a high degree of flexibility to capture all
technologies falling within the scope of the claim, including those
technologies that arise after the patent is filed. At the same time, any
good practitioner would know that by reading a patent application’s
original disclosure, the disclosure rules could be applied in reverse to
derive the broadest claim scope supportable by any applications that
were still pending and within the priority lineage of the pertinent application. This is why no serious practitioners were actually surprised
68
in cases like Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Technologies AG, where patentees
inserted claims into pending applications that were more easily read
to cover allegedly infringing products. Practitioners could also read
versions of a patentee’s applications published overseas or that issued
in some patents and then plan for themselves the likely claims that a
patentee could—and indeed often did—obtain from a pending application. To the extent that applications are not filed overseas, this type
of notice could be improved by publishing all applications soon after
filing.
The biggest red herring in this area is the general degree of uncertainty that always accompanies words, especially in a field like law.
Ironically, some commentators have charged the patent system with
overall uncertainty while simultaneously pushing a set of reforms that
have drastically exacerbated the problem. Recent changes in case law
69
70
from decisions like KSR (obviousness) and Bilski (subject matter)
have injected at least two forms of uncertainty into the system, which
dwarf whatever general linguistic uncertainty is inherent in any system
that uses language. First, these cases have changed their narrow areas
of law from turning on relatively clear, objective tests based largely on
factual evidence to turning on vague questions of legal discretion.
Second, they empower parties to ask courts and agencies to inject the
same degree of legal discretion into similar areas of law, such as the
so-called “utility” and “natural phenomenon” doctrines that have percolated through the courts with renewed energy in cases like Labora-

68

See 318 F.3d 1081, 1084 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (deciding that the patentee did not
commit fraud or breach of contract).
69
See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1730 (2007) (creating a more
flexible obviousness test).
70
See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (creating a more
flexible test for patentable subject matter), petition for cert. filed, 77 U.S.L.W. 3442 (U.S.
Jan. 28, 2009) (No. 08-964).
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tory Corporation of America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc. and
72
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services. Even a basic
understanding of patent law reveals the ways in which these so-called
doctrines are almost specious: a useless patent will never be infringed
and a natural phenomenon is not new. The real traction for these
doctrines is that they lack any precise definition and thus are the playthings of the parties with the best political connections or lobbying
and litigation budgets. At a minimum, the “know it when you see it”
rules that cases like these have generated each time they have crept
into our system allow vast uncertainty to pervade the system as every
area of the black-letter law becomes open to similar conversion. A
simple retreat from this approach would significantly improve certainty for both patentees and alleged infringers.
2. Maintaining Self-Disciplining Tensions
Built into the patent system are a set of self-disciplining tensions
that provide important constraints on the positions that both patentees and alleged infringers can take during negotiations and conflicts
over any particular patent. When these tensions are released, relatively extreme positions are not only arguable, they are almost inescapably winnable. Whatever decision-making option is used, both
sides of these tensions must be maintained in order to keep both sides
of a case honest.
The most basic of these tensions was articulated by Judge Rich:
“The stronger a patent the weaker it is and the weaker a patent the
73
stronger it is.” A patent that is strong on offense (because its claims
sweep especially broadly) is weak on defense (because it is especially
likely to capture some prior art, to be inadequately supported by the
disclosure as filed, or to be insufficiently definite). In contrast, a patent that is weak on offense (because it covers little commercially rele-

71

See 548 U.S. 124, 137 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the dismissal of certiorari) (arguing that a “process” must “not amount to a simple natural correlation, i.e., a
‘natural phenomenon’”)
72
See No. 04cv1200 JAH (RBB), 2008 WL 878910, at *6-10 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28,
2008) (emphasizing the importance of the distinction between man-made and natural
phenomena in determining patentability).
73
Giles S. Rich, The Proposed Patent Legislation: Some Comments, 35 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 641, 644 (1967) (emphasis omitted) (responding to the then-proposed legislation
S. 1042, 90th Cong. (1967); H.R. 5924, 90th Cong. (1967); and REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, “TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF . . . USEFUL ARTS” IN AN AGE OF EXPLODING TECHNOLOGY (1966)).
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vant space) is strong on defense (because it is likely to avoid prior art,
to be adequately supported by the disclosure as filed, and to be definite). Every good patent litigator knows that eliminating the validity
74
side of the case leaves the infringement arguments almost unbridled.
That is why the tension is so important. It keeps each side of the case
from waxing too prosaic about its overall social benefits.
A similar tension exists over the definition of patent law’s famous
technological benchmark: the hypothetical person having ordinary
skill in the art (PHOSITA). Both sides of the case should be kept in
tension about how skilled the PHOSITA is. When determining
whether the originally filed disclosure enables the PHOSITA to make
and use the invention, the patentee is likely to prefer a PHOSITA of
incredibly high skill because even an anemic disclosure is likely to enable such a master of all trades. At the same time, when determining
whether the disclosure of the prior art renders the claim obvious to
the PHOSITA, the patentee is likely to prefer a know-nothing PHOSITA. And of course for both of these issues, the position of the party
challenging validity is simply the other side of the coin.
Even questions of ultimate value are subject to a helpful tension
when the property rights aspects of patents and their owners are most
evident. Property rights function particularly well when they are
owned by easily found residual claimants, and when they are easily
75
traded, bundled, and divided. While the infamous litigation over the
Blackberry email device ultimately settled for over $600 million, the
best evidence suggests that the defendant was initially offered about
one one-hundredth of that amount; that the market’s expected value
was almost twice the settlement amount; that the defendant’s private
valuation was almost three times the settlement amount; and that if
the market for corporate control had been working better, the defendant would have been bought through an LBO, its CEO fired, the
case settled near the market estimate, and the shares sold back to the
76
public, yielding about a forty-percent return on investment. Keeping
74

See, e.g., Matthew D. Powers et al., The Successful Patent Litigator Must Learn the
Way of Strategy: The Opportunities and Risks of Claim Construction, in F. SCOTT KIEFF ET
AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 874-77 (4th ed. 2008) (explaining how a smart patentee will move for summary judgment that the patent is not invalid before claim construction is fully decided).
75
See Haber et al., supra note 8, at 216 (noting that property rights are “at their
best” when structured to be easy to find, predict, bundle, and divide).
76
See Kieff, Coordination, Property, and Intellectual Property, supra note 7, at 397 (explaining the economic forces acting on the parties in the Blackberry litigation, including the restrictions on the market for corporate control).
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changes in ownership off the table greatly contributed to the huge
range in valuation.
CONCLUSION
A well-functioning patent system can be critical to our economy by
fostering innovation, jobs, and capital investment. But a patent system
can also be plagued by frivolous suits, unending process, and extreme
uncertainty. Sound theory and historical practice show that these
dual sets of concerns can be addressed by blending predictable patents with enough flexibility for market actors to contract over them,
while adding or maintaining symmetrical mechanisms to cabin abusive tactics in the procedures for their procurement and enforcement.
Those calling for two-tiered approaches to policing junk patents
are correct that one size does not fit all. But they are wrong to think
that one more size will do the trick. The beauty of a well-functioning
litigation system for policing junk patents is that it offers an extremely
wide range of sizes for an extremely wide range of circumstances.
Such a range can work particularly well when it includes symmetrical
tools for cabining abusive process and providing incentives for all parties in the dispute to obtain and exchange the information most relevant to a decision on the underlying substantive questions about patent validity and infringement. Just as the benefits of court litigation
that are explored here are seriously underexplored—if not totally ignored—by most of the contemporary literature, so too are the problems with administrative approaches to adjudicating patent validity.
The combination suggests that the present patent system may indeed
be a strong candidate for change, but in the opposite direction than
the one called for by most other commentators.

